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The Public Figure Doctrine: A

Reexamination of Gertz v. Robert Welch,

Inc. in Light of Lower Federal Court Public
Figure Formulations
MARK D. WALTON*
INTRODUCTION

If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union
or change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as
monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be
tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.'
A critical issue in most defamation cases is the conflict between the
defendant's freedom of speech or press and the plaintiff's interest in
compensation for reputational damage. Because of the difficulty in proving
the truth of many statements of fact and the First Amendment interest in
matters related to self-government, the United States Supreme Court, in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 rejected the common law rules that subjected
defamation defendants to strict liability unless they could prove the truth of
their statements.3 The Court developed a constitutional privilege to protect
publishers of statements concerning public officials from liability unless the
public official proved that the statement was published with knowledge that
it was false or reckless disregard for whether it was false.4 The goal of the
New York Times Court was to prevent the self-censorship that results from
the inability of a publisher to prove the truth of a particular statement, and
hence, the inability to defend against libel judgments.'

* B.S., Illinois State University; J.D., Northern Illinois University; Judicial Clerk,

Honorable Peg M. Breslin, Illinois Appellate Court, Third District, Ottawa, Illinois.
1. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 n.8 (1974) (quoting Thomas
Jefferson's first Inaugural Address).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 26.
5. See infra note 24.
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In the years following New York Times, the U.S. Supreme Court
expanded the constitutional privilege to protect the publishers of statements
concerning public figures as well as public officials. 6 However, identifying
"public figures" has proven to be a difficult task for courts. In Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,' the U.S. Supreme Court set out what is the current test
for determining whether a defamation plaintiff is a public figure. Since the
Gertz decision, lower courts have taken it upon themselves to develop their
own tests for determining the status of defamation plaintiffs, and these tests
have led to inconsistent and contradictory findings with regard to this
important constitutional issue.9 As a result, publishers are frequently unable
to determine prior to publishing an article whether they will qualify for the
New York Times constitutional privilege, which has led to the very selfcensorship that the New York Times Court sought to avoid? 0
This paper examines the distinctions between public and private figure
defamation plaintiffs. Part I explores the history of defamation law and the
development of the New York Times constitutional privilege. Part II
discusses the expansion of New York Times. Part III looks at the public
figure doctrine as it has developed after Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
discusses the public figure tests that have been formulated by lower federal
courts, and analyzes the application of these tests by the lower courts. Part
IV analyzes the current public figure doctrine as well as the arguments for
and against the Gertz Court's approach to this issue and concludes that any
problems with the Gertz public figure test relate to the manner in which this
test is applied by courts rather than any inherent flaw in the approach.
I. HISTORY OF DEFAMATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The common law of defamation developed in recognition of the
importance of an individual's right to protect his reputation from the injury
caused by false statements." A defamatory statement is one that "tends so

6. See infra part II.

7. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

8. See infra part III B.
9. See infra part III C and part IV.
10. See infra part III C and part IV.

11. Courts have long struggled with the complexities of the common law of
defamation. Many of the inconsistencies and absurdities of the common law development
can be attributed to the conflict between the ecclesiastical courts and the common law courts
over jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 cmt. b (1977). Although it is
not the purpose of this article to detail the extensive common law history of defamation, a
brief overview is necessary to provide a framework for the discussion of the issues
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to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him."' 2 Plaintiffs in a common law action for defamation only needed to
establish that the defendant published"1 a defamatory statement concerning
them to prove a prima facie case. 4 Defendants were then subjected to
strict liability 5 unless they qualified for a very narrow conditional privi-

surrounding public figures. Accordingly, the background discussion is necessarily simplified
and generalized.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). This standard represents a
considerable softening of the effect a statement must have on third parties. Under the
traditional common law, a statement was defamatory only if it caused hatred, contempt, or
ridicule. E.g., Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936).
13. The term "published" in this context refers to the requirement that the defamatory
statement be communicated to a person other than the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 577 (1977).
14. One author described the ease with which the defamation plaintiff could establish
a prima facie case under the common law as follows:
In the typical common law action for defamation, where the statement sued
upon would tend to have any of these effects, the plaintiff need only put
the statement into evidence and prove that the defendant was responsible
for uttering or publishing it to others. He need not prove that the statement
was false, nor that the defendant knew it was false, nor even that the
defendant would have discovered it to be false in the exercise of reasonable
care, nor need he prove that he suffered any actual injury to his reputation
as a result of the defamatory statement.
Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1353 (1975); see also Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 369-70 (White, J., dissenting).
Exceptions to the ease with which a prima facie case could be established depended
upon whether the statement was classified as slander, which is a spoken defamatory
statement, or libel, which is any printed or otherwise widely disseminated defamatory
statement. If danger of reputational harm was evident from a libelous statement without
resort to any extrinsic evidence, the libel was actionable per se as indicated above. A
slanderous statement was actionable per se if it alleged that the plaintiff had committed a
major crime or had a loathsome and communicable disease, alleged unchastity of a woman,
or was likely to cause injury with respect to the plaintiff's occupation. Damages were
presumed in an action for libel per se or slander per se.
If the defamatory meaning of a libelous statement could only be established by resort
to extrinsic facts, the libel was actionable per quod. A plaintiff in an action for libel per
quod or slander that did not fit into one of the four categories of slander per se needed to
plead and prove that special damages of a pecuniary nature resulted from the reputational
harm. Eaton, supra note 14, at 1354-55.
15. According to Professor Prosser:
The effect of this strict liability is to place the printed, written or spoken
word in the same class with the use of explosives or the keeping of
dangerous animals. If a defamatory meaning, which is false, is reasonably
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lege 16 or could establish that the statements were true.' 7
Although the common law of defamation has undergone many changes

throughout history, the foregoing analysis remains largely intact. 8 The
common law of defamation also remained surprisingly unaffected by the
understood, the defendant publishes at his peril, and there is no possible
defense except the rather narrow one of privilege.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 773 (4th ed. 1971).
This treatment can be justified when one considers the ability of modem mass media
to quickly disseminate a statement to millions of people. As one commentator aptly noted,
"the mass media may be likened to highly desirable but necessarily dangerous instrumentalities, whose owners should insure others against the harm they will inevitably cause." Eaton,
supra note 14, at 1359. Several other justifications for the use of strict liability have also
been advanced. It is extremely difficult for a defamation plaintiff to find a witness who will
testify in court that her opinion of the plaintiff was diminished by the defamatory statement
because the witness would have to admit to changing her opinion without determining
whether the statement was true. Id. at 1357. Additionally, whether the defendant acted with
malicious intent or simply made an honest mistake, the injury to the plaintiffs reputation is
the same. Id. at 1358-59.
16. One such privilege is the following conditional "public interest" privilege,
recognized by the Restatement of the Law of Torts:
[a]n occasion is conditionally privileged when the circumstances induce a
correct or reasonable belief that (a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently
important public interest, and (b) the public interest requires the communication of the defamatory matter to a public officer or private citizen and
that such person is authorized or privileged to act if the defamatory matter
is true.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 598 (1938). However, as the comments to this section make
clear, the public interest defense "does not afford a privilege to publish false defamatory
statements of fact about public officers or candidates for office." Id. cmt. a. Additionally,
this defense "is not intended to constitute an all-inclusive category of public interests which
may be protected by the publication of defamatory communications concerning others." Id.
cmt. b.
When a statement could be classified as an opinion of the publisher rather than a
statement of fact, the common law privilege of fair comment provided a defense. See Marc
A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and
Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 854-55 (1984).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977).
18. Under the Restatement, the following elements are required:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the
existence of special harm caused by the publication.
Id. at § 558. The third element, which abandons the strict liability of the common law, is
a direct result of a U.S. Supreme Court decision. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
347-48 (1974) (holding that the U.S. Constitution requires a showing of fault amounting to
at least negligence for recovery in an action for defamation).
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First Amendment until 1964,'9 when the landscape of defamation law was
significantly changed by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.20 In this case, the Court was forced to balance First
Amendment interests with the plaintiffs interest in freedom from the
reputational injury caused by a defamatory falsehood.'
The Court
reversed a judgment in favor of Sullivan because the law applied by the
Alabama courts did not adequately provide for the First Amendment
protection that was necessary when a critic of official conduct is sued by a
public official.22
In an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court began by stating
that our nation is committed "to the principle that debate on public issues
23
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Because of the difficulty
in proving the truth of many statements of fact, rules of law that impose
liability in the absence of truth result in the suppression of true statements.24 The Court rejected the common law's limited protection in favor
19. Dictum in several Supreme Court cases indicated that the First Amendment
provided no protection for libelous publications. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 483, 486-87 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). See also Eaton,
supra note 14, at 1367.
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). On March 29, 1960, the New York Times ran a full page
advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices." This advertisement discussed the civil
rights movement in the South and detailed acts of violence that the participants in this
movement had endured. The advertisement included statements about police conduct at civil
rights demonstrations on a college campus in Montgomery, Alabama and the intimidation,
violence and arrests of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the leader of the movement. A libel
action was brought by L.B. Sullivan, the elected Commissioner of Public Affairs of
Montgomery. Although Sullivan was not mentioned by name in the advertisement, he
asserted that the references to police (in the context of the campus demonstration) and the
arrests of Dr. King would be read as referring to him in his capacity as Commissioner, since
his duties included supervising the police department. Id. at 256-58.
21. See id. at 270.
22. Id. at 264.
23. Id. at 270. Justice Brennan had previously stated that the First Amendment existed
to allow uninhibited debate to bring about social and political changes. Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Justice Brennan's theory of the First Amendment closely
follows that of Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn, who has said:
Public discussions of public issues, together with the spreading of
information and opinion bearing on those issues, must have a freedom
unabridged by our agents. Though they govern us, we, in a deeper sense,
govern them. Over our governing, they have no power. Over their
governing, we have sovereign power.
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 257.
See also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of
the FirstAmendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
24. The Court realized the need for a rule that Would protect honest misstatements of
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of a constitutional system that requires a public official25 to prove "actual
malice, 26 on the part of the publisher of a defamatory falsehood in order
to recover damages.27
In fashioning the constitutional privilege to protect the media against
libel suits brought by public officials,28 the Court recognized that the First
Amendment was grounded on principles of self-government.29 The Court's

fact and explained that the defense of truth was inadequate in this regard:
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all
his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually
unlimited in amount--leads to a comparable "self-censorship."

. .

. Under

such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from
voicing their criticism, even though it is ...in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
25. Although the Court did not address the issue of the types of persons that could be
considered "public officials" in New York Times, the Court later stated that "the 'public
official' designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control
over the conduct of governmental affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
26. The Court defined actual malice as knowledge that a statement is false or reckless
disregard for whether the statement is false. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280. The Court
later stated that a publisher acts with "reckless disregard" where a statement is published
despite awareness of probable falsity, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964), or an
informant is relied upon despite "obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or
the accuracy of his reports." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968). However,
"failure to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have
done so, is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard." Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.
v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989).
27. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
28. One commentator asserts that the New York Times holding represents an expansion
of the privilege of fair comment. David W. Robertson, Defamation and the First
Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 201 (1976).
Although the New York Times Court did not call the standard it created a privilege, it is
useful to think of this standard as a conditional privilege which is defeated by "actual malice"
on the part of the publisher. Id. at 201-02. The Court has subsequently referred to the New
York Times standard as a constitutional privilege. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
334 (1974) ("[In New York Times] this Court defined a constitutional privilege intended to
free criticism of public officials from the restraints imposed by the common law of
defamation."). Accordingly, the term "constitutional privilege" will be used throughout this
paper to refer to the New York Times actual malice standard.
29. Justice Brennan devoted a great deal of attention to the historical significance of
the First Amendment. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 273-80. Justice Brennan's discussion
centered on the Sedition Act of 1798, and the "broad consensus" that any limits on the
criticism of government and public officials is barred by the First Amendment. Id. The
Court also analogized the need for protecting statements made about public officials to the
privilege held by public officials for statements made in the course of performing their
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holding, however, was rather limited.3" Accordingly, it was obvious to
many commentators that an expansion of the New York Times holding would
31
soon follow.
II. EXPANSION OF NEW YORK TIMES TO INCLUDE PUBLIC FIGURES
Following the New York Times decision, the Court proceeded to clarify
and expand the constitutional privilege. 32 The first major expansion came

three years later in the companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
and Associated Press v. Walker.3 a

official functions. Id. at 281-82 (citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959)). Just as public
officials need to be free from vexing libel suits concerning statements made in the
performance of their official duties, the "citizen-critic of government" needs similar
protection when exercising her duty of self-government. Id. at 282 ("It is as much [the
citizen-critic's] duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer.").
The Court addressed its opinion to any critic of an official's conduct, but the
implications of the decision apply mostly to those who broadcast or otherwise publish and
distribute multiple copies of a statement. A private person making a slanderous statement
about a public official is unlikely to even draw the official's attention unless the statement
is also published in some form in the media. Subsequent decisions by the Court have
implied that the First Amendment implications announced in New York Times apply only to
media defendants. E.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343 (referring to the New York Times balancing
formula as weighing the needs of the press, publishers and broadcasters against the
individual's claim for damages caused by reputational harm). See also Gerald G. Ashdown,
Of Public Figures and Public Interest--The Libel Law Conundrum, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
937, 939 n.19 (1984). The Court has not specifically addressed the issue of whether the New
York Times First Amendment implications apply differently to media and nonmedia
defendants. When squarely faced with this issue, the Court avoided a direct ruling. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). However, a majority of
the Court refused to distinguish media defendants from nonmedia defendants for First
Amendment purposes. Id. at 783-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30. See Eaton, supra note 14, at 1390 ("The theory of the first amendment expounded
in New York Times was much broader than the limited privilege which it produced there.").
31. Id. See also Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. Cr. REV. 191, 221.
32. See Robertson, supra note 28, at 202-03 (discussing a series of 12 Supreme Court
cases that clarified and expanded the constitutional standard).
33. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Butts case involved a Saturday Evening Post article
accusing University of Georgia athletic director Wally Butts of conspiring with University
of Alabama football coach Paul "Bear" Bryant to fix a football game between the two
universities. Id. at 135-36. According to this article, a salesman named George Burnett
accidentally overheard a telephone conversation between Butts and Bryant where Butts
detailed the offensive and defensive strategy to be employed by the University of Georgia
football team in its game against the University of Alabama. Id. at 136. The jury found that
the article's statements were false, and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages to
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In Curtis, the Court unanimously agreed that the First Amendment
requires a balancing of the societal interest in protecting an individual's
reputation against defamatory harm and the competing societal interest in the
uninhibited debate over important matters. Accordingly, the justices agreed
that the First Amendment considerations articulated in New York Times
applied to "public figures" in addition to public officials.34 However, the
Court could not agree on how to define public figures or the appropriate
level of constitutional protection that should be applied to them.
Justice Harlan, joined by three other justices, pointed out that although
neither Butts nor Walker held government positions, the public interest in
the issues involved in both cases "is not less than that involved in New York
Times."35 Both Butts and Walker were subjects of public interest regarding
matters unrelated to the publications at issue. 36 Because of the public
interest that they commanded independent of the matters at issue in the
respective publications, Justice Harlan believed that Butts and Walker had
the ability to expose the untruthfulness of the defamatory statements made
about them. 37 Thus, in identifying public figures, Harlan focused on the
extent of the public's interest in the plaintiff.
Chief Justice Warren, writing for four other members of the Court,
defined public figures as those who "by reason of their fame, shape events

Butts. Id. at 138.
The Walker case involved an Associated Press news dispatch pertaining to
eyewitness accounts of a riot at the University of Mississippi. Id. at 140. Walker was a
former U.S. Army general who was well known for his strong views against the federal
government's use of force to intervene in local or state matters. The article stated that
Walker had led a student attack on federal marshals, and encouraged students to use violence
in their protests. Id. Although the jury awarded both compensatory and punitive damages
to Walker, the trial judge vacated the punitive damage award after finding that there was no
basis for the jury to conclude that the article was written with malice. Id. at 141-42.
At the time these articles were published, neither Butts nor Walker were public
officials. Id. at 135, 140. These companion cases will hereafter be referred to collectively
as the Curtis case.
34. Id. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring) ("All of us agree that the basic considerations
underlying the First Amendment require that some limitations be placed on the application
of state libel laws to 'public figures' as well as 'public officials."').
35. Id. at 154.
36. Id. Justice Harlan pointed out that Butts was the subject of public interest due
simply to his position as the University of Georgia athletic director, while Walker
commanded public attention due to his "purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his
personality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy." Id. at 155.
37. Id. at 154-55. See also James J. Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v.
Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and The First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777,
785 (1975).
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in areas of concern to society at large," as well as those who are "intimately
involved in the resolution of important public questions. 3 8 These differing
views led Justices Harlan and Warren to conclude that different levels of
First Amendment protection were appropriate in libel cases that involve
public figure plaintiffs. Justice Harlan felt that the New York Times actual
malice standard should be somewhat softened with respect to public figures.
He held that a public figure may recover damages from a publisher who
prints a defamatory falsehood "on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. 3 9 Chief Justice
Warren, on the other hand, believed that the New York Times standard
should apply to public figures as well as public officials.4
Four years after Curtis, the Court once again expanded the First
Amendment principles applicable to defamation cases. In Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.,41 the Court was faced with the question of what impact
the First Amendment should have in defamation cases involving a plaintiff
who could not be labelled either a public official or public figure.42 In a
plurality opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun and Chief
38. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Warren's
focus was more on the issues that the particular plaintiff was involved in rather than the
public's interest in the plaintiff herself. Warren appears to hold the opinion that a plaintiff's
involvement in issues of public concern necessarily means that she has access to the means
by which the defamatory statements may be addressed. See Brosnahan, supra note 37, at
785-86.
39. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 155. Harlan discussed the general tort principle for
determining the appropriate standard of care by balancing the importance of the defendant's
activities and the plaintiff's need for protection from the harm he has suffered. Because of
the public's interest in both Butts and Walker, circulation of information pertaining to their
activities was important. Likewise, their access to avenues of counterargument limit their
need for greater court protection from the harm they have suffered by the defamatory
statements. Id. at 154-55. Accordingly, the standard of care articulated by Justice Harlan
is consistent with that which would be used in any other tort case involving a defendant
whose activity is important to society and a plaintiff who shows no need for special
protection from the court.
40. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). This holding is consistent with a definition
of public figures as those whose activities have the same social impact and importance as the
activities of public officials.

41. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).

42. The Rosenbloom case involved a distributor of nudist magazines who was arrested
for violating Philadelphia obscenity laws. Id. at 33-34. A local radio station broadcast in
its news segment that the plaintiff had been arrested and obscene books had been confiscated.
Id. After being acquitted of the criminal charges based on instructions from the trial judge
that the magazines were, as a matter of law, not obscene, the plaintiff filed a defamation
action against the radio station. Id. at 36.
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Justice Burger, asserted that the New York Times actual malice standard
should apply when a defamatory falsehood is published about a private
individual if the subject of the defamatory statement was a matter of "public
or general concern."43
The Court was once again divided over the issue of the proper balance
between the interest in protecting a defamation plaintiff's reputation and the
interest in free and open debate on matters of interest to the public." In
extending the constitutional privilege articulated in New York Times to
defamatory publications regarding a private individual's involvement in a
matter of "public or general concern, '45 the plurality expanded on the selfgovernance principles of the First Amendment.46 Justice Brennan observed
that self-government requires comment on the actions of private individuals
43. Id. at 52. In addition to this extension of the New York Times standard, the
plurality opinion added the requirement that proof of actual malice be by clear and
convincing evidence rather than by a mere preponderance of the evidence. Id.
44. Justice Black concurred in the result, but noted that he believed that the First
Amendment precludes recovery of a libel judgement by any plaintiff based on defamatory
comments made by the news media. Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice White concurred in the judgment because of his belief that the New York Times
standard applied to any statements concerning the "official actions of public servants." Id.
at 62 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). He pointed out that in this case, "the public
would learn nothing if publication only of the fact that the police made an arrest were
permitted; it is also necessary that the grounds for the arrest and, in many circumstances, the
identity of the person arrested be stated." Id. at 61.
Justice Harlan and Justice Marshall wrote separate dissenting opinions, asserting that
states should be allowed to set the standard of care with regard to truth in defamation cases
involving private individuals, provided that strict liability is not used. Id. at 69 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Marshall voiced concern over
courts determining whether a particular issue is of public or general concern. Id. at 79
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. On a single page of the Rosenbloom opinion, Justice Brennan refers to matters of
"public or general concern" three times, and matters of "public or general interest" three
times, without distinguishing the terms. Id. at 44 n.12. Therefore, it would seem that the
terms "interest" and "concern" are interchangeable. Although Justice Brennan did not
clearly define these terms, he did state that
the constitutional protection was not intended to be limited to matters
bearing broadly on issues of responsible government. "[T]he Founders..
. felt that a free press would advance truth, science, morality, and arts in
general as well as responsible government." Comments in other cases
reiterate this judgment that the First Amendment extends to myriad matters
of public interest.
Id. at 42 (citation omitted) (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147
(1967)). The terms "public interest" and "public concern" as used throughout this paper by
the author will carry this same meaning.
46. See supra notes 23, 29 and accompanying text.
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in addition to public officials because our political system leaves a great
deal of power in the hands of private citizens.4 7 Accordingly, he felt that
the status of the individual plaintiff had little to do with the interests
advanced by the First Amendment.48
The Rosenbloom Court's focus on the subject of the defamatory
statement as opposed to the status of the plaintiff was short-lived. Only
three years later, a majority of the Court abandoned the central holding of
the Rosenbloom plurality in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.49 The Gertz
decision returned to a focus on the status of the plaintiff when faced with
balancing First Amendment interests and the individual's interest in freedom
from the reputational harm caused by defamation. °
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Powell, the Court pointed out
the inherent problems associated with requiring judges to determine "which
publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do
not."'0' The Court distinguished public persons52 from private individuals
47. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 41. Justice Brennan discussed the interaction of the First
Amendment with other constitutional principles, stating that,
[t]he commitment of the country to the institution of private property,
protected by the Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses in the
Constitution, places in private hands vast areas of economic and social
power that vitally affect the nature and quality of life in the Nation. Our
efforts to live and work together in a free society not completely dominated
by governmental regulation necessarily encompass far more than politics
in a narrow sense .... ." Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its
historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to
cope with the exigencies of their period.".
Id. (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
48. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 41-44.
49. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The plaintiff in Gertz was an attorney who represented the
family of a youth who was shot and killed by a Chicago police officer. Id. at 325. The
officer was subsequently convicted of second degree murder, and the plaintiff represented the
victim's family in a civil suit against the officer. Id. The defendant published an article
falsely accusing the plaintiff of being a Communist, Marxist, and Leninist. Id. at 326. The
article also falsely accused the plaintiff of having a lengthy police record and falsely asserted
that the plaintiff was responsible for the frame-up of the police officer. Id.
50. Id. at 343.
51. Id. at 346. The majority questioned both the propriety of having judges determine
whether a particular publication addressed an issue of public concern and the ability of
judges to make such determinations. Id. In expressing his belief that the First Amendment
is an absolute bar to libel actions regarding statements made concerning "public affairs,"
Justice Douglas stated that "any matter of sufficient general interest to prompt media
coverage may be said to be a public affair." Id. at 357 n.6 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
52. The term "public persons" is used by Powell to refer to both public officials and
public figures. Id. at 343.
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by concluding that public persons have greater access to the channels of
communication which may be utilized to correct false statements.5 3
Additionally, with very few exceptions, public persons voluntarily place
themselves in the spotlight and must accept the concomitant public
attention.54 Powell believed that states should be given greater latitude in
striking the appropriate balance between reputational and First Amendment
interests in cases involving a private figure plaintiff because "private
individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and
5
public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery. 5 The Court also
53. Id. at 344. The Gertz majority disagreed with the plurality in Rosenbloom on this
point. The plurality thought that only in rare cases will access to the media correct the
defamatory statement. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971). The
plurality stated:
(I]n First Amendment terms, the cure seems far worse than the disease. If
the States fear that private citizens will not be able to respond adequately
to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring
their ability to respond, rather than in stifling public discussion of matters
of public concern.
Id. at 47.
The Gertz majority defended its position, stating that "the fact that the self-help
remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant
to our inquiry." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9.
54. Id. at 344-45. The Gertz Court disagreed with the Rosenbloom plurality on this
point as well. According to the plurality, "the idea that certain 'public' figures have
voluntarily exposed their entire lives to public inspection, while private individuals have kept
theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at best, a legal fiction." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S.
at 48. The plurality asserted that this distinction leads to the paradoxical result of
discouraging discussion about matters of public interest involving private individuals, while
encouraging discussion of matters that are not of public interest when the party involved is
a public figure. Id.
The Gertz Court, however, used this consideration to distinguish public persons from
private persons, such that involvement in a "public controversy" is required to render a
plaintiff who has not achieved "pervasive power and influence" a public figure. As will be
discussed later, under Gertz, unless the plaintiff has achieved such "pervasive power and
influence," involvement in a purely private matter will not render one a public figure--despite
the level of public interest in the matter. See infra notes 60 and 62 and accompanying text.
55. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. While the New York Times opinion focused on First
Amendment issues by discussing the balancing equation in terms of how much the common
law must yield to the First Amendment, the Gertz Court focused on the states' interest in
compensating individuals for defamatory harm. Cf New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964) ("[Wle consider this case against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open.") with Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343 ("[W]e conclude that the state interest in
compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule [than
the New York Times rule] should obtain with respect to them."); see Brosnahan, supra note
37, at 787-88. The Gertz majority noted that Justice Stewart had advocated allowing the

1995]

THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE

pointed out that focusing only on the issue of whether the subject matter of
a defamatory statement involved an issue of public interest, without regard
for the status of the plaintiff, provided inadequate protection of both First
Amendment interests5 6 and the states' interest in compensating private.
individuals for reputational harm." The Court held that as long as strict
liability was not imposed, states could make their own determinations of the
appropriate level of conduct (with respect to the truth of a statement) that
a private individual must prove to recover damages from the publisher of a
defamatory falsehood.58 However, the Court also held that defamation
states to determine their own approach to defamation cases involving private plaintiffs in his
concurring opinion in Rosenblatt v. Baer. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 ("The protection of private
personality . . . is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.") (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)). This shift in focus signaled a retreat from the continued expansion of New York
Times that took place in the years following that decision as well as a retreat from the
expansive holding of the Rosenbloom plurality.
56. When constitutional protection hinges on the subject matter of the statement alone,
liability will be dependent upon the particular judge's view of the subject matter of the
defamatory statement. Where the judge believes that the subject is not a matter of public
interest, the publisher will be liable for damages, despite reasonable efforts on the part of the
publisher to ensure the accuracy of the statement. Additionally, with punitive damages and
the common law concept of presumed damages, liability will often exceed the actual injury
that resulted from the statement. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
57. The Court stated that the differences between public and private persons justified
treating them differently. When a defamatory statement is found to be a matter of public
interest, private plaintiffs who cannot prove actual malice will have no recourse for the harm
to their reputation, despite the fact that they have "relinquished no part of [their] interest in
the protection of [their] own good name, and consequently [they have] a more compelling
call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood." Id. at 345. And
unlike public figures, private individuals lack sufficient access to the media to rebut
defamatory statements. Id. at 346.
58. Id. at 347. The change in the Court's view of this issue was made possible by the
addition of two new members to the Court, Justices Powell and Rehnquist. These new
justices were joined by Marshall and Stewart, who advocated the same position as they did
in their Rosenbloom dissent. See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 86-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, only one more justice was needed to carry a majority. A rather reluctant
Justice Blackmun, who had joined the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom, provided the critical
fifth vote. In a concurring opinion expressly observing the need for a majority holding on
this issue, Justice Blackmun pointed to the restriction of damages to actual loss in the
absence of actual malice, infra note 59 and accompanying text, as affording the critical
protection required by the First Amendment. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 354 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("I feel that it is of profound importance for the Court to come to rest in the
defamation area and to have a clearly defined majority position that eliminates the unsureness
engendered by Rosenbloom's diversity.").
Justice White vigorously objected to the Court's rejection of strict liability in the
area of defamation. He stated that a defamatory falsehood should result in recovery by a
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plaintiffs who did not prove actual malice on the part of the defendant were
limited to recovery for actual injury.59
The Gertz Court was then faced with determining whether the plaintiff
was a public figure or a private individual. The majority defined two
distinct types of public figures: those who "occupy positions of such
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all
purposes "6' and those who "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies 61 in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved. ' 62 The Court also noted that it is possible for a person to
private plaintiff without having to prove any degree of fault, because between the plaintiff
and the defendant who publishes a false statement, the defendant is the only culpable party.
Id. at 392-93 (White, J., dissenting). As one commentator put it:
At this point Justice White and the majority parted company. Justice White
would have proceeded to hold that private individuals defamed by the news
media may journey into the common law forest to seek recompense and
vindication. The majority, however, was clearly afraid of the traditional
hostility of the forest to defamatory falsehoods.
Eaton, supra note 14 at 1413.
59. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-50. The Court's concern that juries have historically
rendered large damage awards to defamation plaintiffs, sometimes in the absence of any
proof of actual loss (presumed damages and punitive damages), prompted this restriction.
Id. at 349-50. "States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs ... gratuitous
awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury." Id. at 349. The Court stated
that:
actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more
customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include
impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering ....
[AII awards must be
supported by competent evidence concerning the injury, although there
need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury.
Id. at 350. See supra note 14 for a discussion of the common law of defamation and
presumed damages.
60. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. Those plaintiffs who fit into this category, referred to as
general purpose public figures, are celebrities who have achieved notoriety with respect to
a wide range of issues. As the Court stated, relatively few plaintiffs will fit into this
category. Id. General purpose public figures are considered public figures for all purposes.
61. "Public controversies" as the term is used in this context, should not be confused
with "public or general concerns" or matters of "public or general interest" as referred to in
the Rosenbloom plurality opinion. See supra note 45. As one commentator noted, "[t]he
public controversy formulation is linked to the plaintiff's voluntary participation in the public
arena, but the public concern test looks primarily to the speech itself." RODNEY A. SMOLLA,
LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3.03[2] (1986) (footnote omitted). Use of the term "public
controversy" throughout this paper will refer to the term as it is used in the Gertz case.
62. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. This category of plaintiffs, referred to as limited purpose
public figures, are considered public figures only with regard to the limited range of issues
involved in the particular public controversy into which they have injected themselves.
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become a public figure through no intentional action of their own, but it did
not elaborate on this possibility and indicated that these situations would be
exceedingly rare.6 a
The majority concluded that the plaintiff had not achieved general fame
or notoriety and his role in the controversy that gave rise to the defamation
was limited to representing his client.6 Accordingly, the Court upheld the
trial court's determination that the plaintiff was not a public figure.65
III. THE POST-GER7z PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE
Although the Gertz Court attempted to lay the public figure issue to
rest, the fact that this issue does not lend itself to the establishment of clear,
objective criteria by which to evaluate a plaintiff's status has resulted in
inconsistent applications of the Gertz paradigm by lower courts.' Unfortunately, the Court has failed to adequately clarify this issue in its subsequent
cases.
A. SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF THE PUBLIC FIGURE ISSUE

Less than two years after the Gertz decision, the public figure issue
67
again made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Firestone.
This case involved a report in Time Magazine regarding the divorce
proceedings between the heir to the Firestone Tire fortune and his wife. The
final judgment order of the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County, Florida
reported the various accusations of the parties and indicated that much of the
testimony was unreliable, but nevertheless granted the divorce on the
63. Id. Later in the majority opinion, the Court referred to persons being "drawn into"
a public controversy. These references appeared to create a category of "involuntary" public
figures. Id. at 351. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have implied that involuntary public
figures are those who are drawn into a public controversy through no purposeful conduct of
their own, and who thereafter attract public attention and seek to influence the resolution of
the issues involved in that controversy. See infra notes 71, 78 and accompanying text.
However, the Court has not directly articulated a definition of involuntary public figures.
64. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52. The Court noted that the plaintiff had not discussed
the issues involved in his client's case with the press. Accordingly, the court concluded that
the plaintiff had neither "thrust himself into the vortex" of the issue, nor engaged "the
public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome." Id. at 352.
65. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
66. One lower court stated that the process of defining a public figure was "much like
trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall." Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp.
440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976), affid. 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
67. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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grounds of the parties' lack of domestication. The defendant magazine
published a report of the divorce, summarizing only the husband's
accusations and incorrectly stating that these accusations were the basis for
the court's decision to grant the divorce.6 Mary Alice Firestone brought
an action against Time for defamation.
The defendant asserted that Mary Alice Firestone was a public figure,
and therefore could not recover for the defamatory falsehood without
showing actual malice on the part of the defendant.69 The Court, however,
disagreed with this assertion. First, the plaintiffs marriage to the heir of the
Firestone fortune and her prominence in Palm Beach social affairs were not
sufficient to render her a general purpose public figure. Although the
plaintiff had achieved notoriety in the Palm Beach area, it seems clear that
she had not achieved the "pervasive power and influence" that the Gertz
Court had indicated was characteristic of general purpose public figures.70
Additionally, the plaintiff had not thrust herself into the forefront of any
controversy in order to influence its resolution. The Court did not accept
the defendant's argument that the public's apparent interest in the divorce
and the plaintiffs direct involvement in it were sufficient to render her a
limited purpose public figure.7 The Court noted that divorce proceedings
are not the kind of public controversy referred to in Gertz,72 and the
68. Id. at 450-52.
69. Id. at 452-53.
70. Id. at 453.
71. Id. at 453-54. The Court noted that to accept this argument would be to reinstate
the Rosenbloom public interest test.
Some commentators have suggested that the plaintiff in this case is exactly the sort
of involuntary public figure that the Gertz Court alluded to, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 345 (1974), and the Court's failure to recognize her as an involuntary public figure
after stating that she was "drawn into" the courtroom was an indication that the Court had
abandoned this classification. E.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in
ConstitutionalPolicy-Making, 61 MINN. L. REV. 645, 681 n.175 (1977). However, the Court
stated:
while participants in some litigation may be legitimate "public figures,"
either generally or for the limited purpose of that litigation, the majority
will more likely resemble respondent, drawn into a public forum largely
against their will in order to attempt to obtain the only redress available to
them or to defend themselves against actions brought by the State or by
others. There appears little reason why these individuals should substantially forfeit that degree of protection which the law of defamation would
otherwise afford them simply by virtue of their being drawn into a
courtroom.
Firestone,424 U.S. at 457.
72. Firestone,424 U.S. at 454. Some commentators feel that, despite the fact that the
Gertz Court abandoned the Rosenbloom holding due to the inherent problems associated with

1995]

THE PUBLC FIGURE DOCTRINE

plaintiff had assumed no "special prominence in the resolution of public
questions."
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the public figure issue again in
Hutchinson v. Proxmire." Ronald Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist and
adjunct professor at Western Michigan University, received research grants
from the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and the Office of Naval Research.74 William Proxmire, a
U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, initiated a public campaign to expose what he
believed was wasteful government spending by giving a "Golden Fleece"
75
award to federal agencies responsible for funding wasteful projects.
Proxmire chose the federal agencies that funded Hutchinson's research for
one of his awards, giving a speech at a press conference to describe the
activities of Hutchinson and the federal money that he believed was being
wasted on his research. 6 Thereafter, Hutchinson filed suit against
Proxmire for defamation. The Court held that Hutchinson was not a limited
purpose public figure. 7
The Court based its holding on two grounds. First, Hutchinson did not
voluntarily thrust himself into the forefront of this controversy. Rather, his
conduct became the subject of public controversy only in response to
Proxmire's conduct.78 Second, Hutchinson did not have adequate access to
a judicial determination of whether a particular publication addressed a matter of public
concern, see supra note 51 and accompanying text, the Firestone Court's conclusion turned

on this very issue. See Erik Walker, Comment, Defamation Law: Public Figures--Who Are

They?, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 963 (1993) (criticizing the Court for failing to clarify the
Gertz standard and for returning to the Rosenbloom public interest test). According to this
criticism, concluding that divorce proceedings are not sufficiently controversial to warrant
classifying the parties to such proceedings as public figures is no different than concluding
that divorce proceedings are not a matter of public concern.
However, instead of departing from the holding in Gertz, the FirestoneCourt merely
clarified it. The Gertz Court did not hold that the subject of a defamatory statement was
completely irrelevant. Rather, the Court believed that application of the constitutional
privilege should not hinge solely on the subject matterof the statement without regard for
the status of the plaintiff. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. The Gertz Court focused on the status of
the plaintiff; "the public controversy formulation is linked to the plaintiff's voluntary
participation in the public arena," while "the public concern test looks primarily to the speech
itself." SMOLLA, supra note 61, at § 3.03[2] (footnote omitted).
73. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
74. Id. at 114-15.
75. Id. at 114.
76. Id. at 115-16. The contents of the speech were also incorpoiated into an advance
press release. Id.
77. The defendant did not contend that Hutchinson was a general purpose public
figure. Id. at 134.
78. Id. at 134-35. Some commentators have suggested that the plaintiffs in Firestone
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media channels by which he could correct the defamatory statement. The
Court indicated that instead of the regular and continuing access to the
media indicative of public figure status, Hutchinson's media access was
limited to responding to the defamatory statements.79
In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc.,' a case decided on the
same day as Hutchinson, the U.S. Supreme Court once again faced the
public figure issue. The plaintiff, Ilya Wolston, was the nephew of admitted
Russian spies. Wolston failed to appear pursuant to a grand jury subpoena
issued during a 1958 investigation of espionage charges. He received some
media attention for his failure to appear and for the contempt of court
proceeding that resulted, but he was never indicted for espionage and the
media attention quickly subsided."' In 1974, Reader's Digest published a
book in which the plaintiff was referred to as a "Soviet agent." Thereafter,
82
Wolston commenced an action for defamation against Reader's Digest.
Although it was not contended that Wolston had achieved a level of
notoriety that would render him a general purpose public figure, the
defendant argued and the lower courts agreed that Wolston was a limitedpurpose public figure as defined in Gertz. 3 However, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts' determination in this regard, stating that
and Hutchinson were involuntary public figures, and that the Court's failure to recognize
these plaintiffs as involuntary public figures indicates that the Court has abandoned this
classification. See supra note 71 for a discussion of this issue in relation to the Firestone
case; see also Ashdown, supra note 29, at 941 n.28; David L. Wallis, Comment, The Revival
of Involuntary Limited-Purpose Public Figures--Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc.,
1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 313, 318 (1987). However, as the Hutchinson Court noted, "those
charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making
the claimant a public figure." Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135. Rather, the involuntary public
figures referred to in Gertz are those who find themselves at the center of a public
controversy and are subsequently the subject of a defamatory statement. In an action against
a different defendant for a subsequent defamatory statement regarding the propriety of
Hutchinson's research, perhaps Hutchinson's comments to the press in response to Proxmire's
statements would have been sufficient to render him an involuntary public figure.
79. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 136. This finding by the Court was prompted by a lower
court's reliance on Hutchinson's statements to the press in response to Proxmire's award.
id. at 134. However, the Court aptly noted that this access to the media came only after
Proxmire's defamatory statement, and "those charged with defamation cannot, by their own
conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure." Id. at 134-35.
The Court also noted that Hutchinson's media access was limited to responding to Proxmire's
defamatory statement, rather than the "regular and continuing access to the media that is one
of the accouterments of having become a public figure." Id. at 136.
80. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
81. Id. at 161-63.
82. Id. at 159-60.
83. Id. at 165.
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despite the fact that Wolston's voluntary decision not to appear before the
grand jury was likely to attract media attention, this was not the type of
activity that establishes public figure status. Wolston never discussed the
matter with the press and limited his involvement in the case to his defense
against the contempt charges. The Court concluded that Wolston acted
similarly to the plaintiff in Gertz, who had not discussed the litigation with
the press and limited his involvement in the controversy to the representation of his private client.8 4 Additionally, Wolston did not fail to appear
before the grand jury for the purpose of influencing the public with respect
to any controversy. 5 Citing Firestone, the Court also rejected the notion
that engaging in criminal conduct automatically confers public figure status
on an 6individual for purposes of comment on the issues related to the
crime.8
In each of these cases, the Court clarified the public figure doctrine it
announced in Gertz. However, the test for analyzing the status of defamation plaintiffs has not resulted in consistent results when applied by lower
courts.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC FIGURE TESTS BY LOWER COURTS

The U.S. Supreme Court's failure to articulate a precise standard for
determining a defamation plaintiffs status that can be applied to varying
fact situations has led to inconsistent and conflicting lower court determinations with regard to this issue. Lower courts appear to have taken advantage
of this lack of clarity in the U.S. Supreme Court cases by developing their
own tests for determining the status of defamation plaintiffs. This section
will be devoted to a discussion of three such tests developed by lower
courts.
1. Waldbaum v. FairchildPublications,Inc.87
Eric Waldbaum served as the president and chief executive officer of
Greenbelt Consumer Services, Inc., from 1971 until 1976, when he was
dismissed by the board of directors. During his tenure with Greenbelt,

84. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 166.
85. Id. at 168. The Court stated that Woiston did not "invite[] a citation for contempt
in order to use the contempt citation as a fulcrum to create public discussion about the
methods being used in connection with an investigation or prosecution." Id.
86. Id. at 168-69. See supra note 71.
87. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
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Waldbaum implemented progressive policies in the supermarket industry and
he received continuing press coverage in trade journals and other publications as an advocate of "unit pricing" and "open dating." Supermarket
News, a publication owned by Fairchild Publications, Inc., ran a story about
Waldbaum's 1976 dismissal by the Greenbelt board. This article indicated
that Greenbelt had been losing money and retrenching. Waldbaum subsequently commenced an action against Fairchild for defamation in federal
district court."8
In a summary judgment motion, Fairchild asserted that Waldbaum was
a limited purpose public figure and was therefore precluded from recovering
damages for defamation because he had admitted that the defendant did not
act with "actual malice." The district court agreed that Waldbaum was a
limited purpose public figure and granted Fairchild's motion for summary
judgment. 9 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed."
The court of appeals began by emphasizing the need for clear
guidelines for determining a defamation plaintiff's status.9 ' The court
noted that to be considered a general purpose public figure, a plaintiff must
be a well known celebrity--one whose name is a "household word." 92 A
limited purpose public figure, according to the Waldbaum court, is a person
who "is attempting to have, or realistically can be expected to have, a major
impact on the resolution of a specific public dispute that has foreseeable and
substantial ramifications for persons beyond its immediate participants."' 93
To assist lower courts.in determining whether a plaintiff is a limited purpose
public figure, the court developed a three-part test.
The first step identified by the court was isolating the public controversy. The court defined a public controversy as a dispute that has received
media attention because it will in some way directly impact a segment of the
88. Id. at 1290.
89. Id. at 1290-91.
90. Id. at 1300.

91. "Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not yet fleshed out the skeletal descriptions
of public figures and private persons enunciated in Gertz. The very purpose of the rule

announced in New York Times, however, requires courts to articulate clear standards that can
guide both the press and the public." Id. at 1292.
92., Id. at 1294. The court listed several factors that could be considered in this
determination, including: statistical surveys regarding name recognition, previous media
coverage of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's influence on the actions of others, and whether the
plaintiff has successfully shunned media attention. Id. at 1295. The court pointed out that
the most important aspects of this determination are the voluntariness of the plaintiff's
notoriety and the plaintiff's access to the media. Id.
93. Id. at 1292.
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public or the public in general." Newsworthiness alone will not make a
dispute a public controversy because the defamatory statement itself shows
that the media thought the matter deserved coverage.95
The second step in the Waldbaum test involves an analysis of the
plaintiff's role in the identified controversy. According to the U.S. Supreme
Court in Gertz, only those who "thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies" may be considered limited purpose public
figures.9
Accordingly, "[t]rivial or tangential participation is not
97
'
enough."
Additionally, the plaintiff either must have been intentionally
attempting to impact the resolution of the controversy or have been expected
to influence its outcome due to their position relative to the controversy..
The plaintiffs prior conduct, the public's reaction to that conduct, and the
amount of media attention attracted by the plaintiff are all factors that can
be considered by a court in making this determination.98
The final step in the Waldbaum court's limited purpose public figure test
involves an analysis of the relationship of the defamatory statement to the
plaintiff's role in the particular controversy. The defamatory statement "must
have been germane to the plaintiff's participation in the controversy. "99
In applying this three-part test to the facts of the case, the Waldbaum
court determined that Greenbelt's unique business practices qualified as a
public controversy. Its innovative practices as the second largest consumer
cooperative in the country, including unit pricing and open dating, commanded
the attention of the media and spawned public debate. These innovative business strategies had a direct impact on both grocery retailers and consumers. 00
As president of Greenbelt, Waldbaum vigorously pursued the policies that
attracted the attention of the public and the press. Additionally, Waldbaum set
out to educate the public about consumer cooperatives through both public
meetings' 0 ' and the publication of a monthly newspaper. °' The court was
careful to point out that being the president of a large company does not, ipso
facto, make one a limited purpose public figure. However, Waldbaum's
aggressive public pursuit of innovative consumer-oriented policies led the

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1296.

Id.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297.
Id.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1299.
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1299.
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court to conclude that he had thrust himself to the forefront of these controversies by voluntarily attempting to influence their resolution. 0 3 Therefore,
the court found that Waldbaum was a limited purpose public figure for the
purpose of commentary on the policies he implemented at Greenbelt. The
court also concluded that the article in Supermarket News was sufficiently
related to Waldbaum's participation in this controversy to warrant the
protection of the constitutional privilege."°4 Since Waldbaum had conceded
that Fairchild did not act with actual malice, the appellate court affirmed the
district court's decision to grant summary judgment for Fairchild.'0 5
2. Lerman v. Flynt DistributingCo., Inc.'o6
Jackie Collins Lerman, who is known professionally as novelist Jackie
Collins, was mistakenly identified as the subject of two nude photographs in
the May, 1980 issue of Adelina magazine. The photographs were printed from
a scene in the movie "The World is Full of Married Men." The movie, which
was directed by Lerman's husband, was a screen adaptation of one of her
books. 0 7 The cover of the magazine proclaimed that it contained nude
photographs of Jackie Collins and the captions identified the photos as being
the plaintiff. Although the subject of the nude photographs was the actress
who appeared in an "orgy" scene in the movie, it was later established that
Lerman had not appeared in the movie in any fashion.10 8 While the issue of
the magazine was still in distribution channels, Flynt Distributing purchased
the contract to distribute the magazine and was joined with the magazine and
its original distributor as defendants in an action by Lerman to enjoin
distribution and for damages. 3 9
The district court enjoined the distribution of the magazine, and a
subsequent jury trial against Flynt resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. The
jury awarded Lerman $7 million in compensatory damages and $33 million in
punitive damages. The district court later struck $30 million of the punitive
damage award." 0 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit addressed the Gertz public figure doctrine, despite the fact that the

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1300.
Id.
Id.
745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985).
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 128.
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plaintiff's theory of the case was privacy rather than defamation.", The
court held that the plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure, reversed the
2
judgment in her favor, and dismissed the case."
After a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Gertz and its
progeny, the court formulated a limited purpose public figure test. The court
held that in order to establish that the plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure,
[a] defendant must show the plaintiff has: (1) successfully invited
public attention to his views in an effort to influence others prior to
the incident that is the subject of litigation; (2) voluntarily injected
himself into a public controversy related to the subject of the
litigation; (3) assumed a position of prominence in the public
controversy; and (4) maintained regular and continuing access to the
media." 3'
The court then applied this test to the facts of the case.
With regard to the first factor, the court found that Lerman had successfully invited public attention to her views in an attempt to influence others by
seeking publicity for herself and her books and by devoting her novels and
frequent appearances in the media to the discussion of sexual mores." 4 The
court found that relations between the sexes and nudity in films were public
controversies." 5 Lerman had voluntarily injected herself into these controversies by making them the subject of her books and media appearances.
Since the photographs and accompanying article about Lerman and nudity in
films were related to these controversies, the second factor of the court's
public figure test was also satisfied. As for the third factor, Lerman had
achieved prominence in the controversy surrounding sexual mores by devoting
her successful career to this subject. Finally, Lerman purposefully maintained
access to the media as a means of maintaining her popularity and success." 6

111. Lerman, 745 F.2d at 134-35. "[Rlegardless of whether Ms. Lerman's cause of
action is cast in terms of libel or false light .... the same constitutional protections apply."
Id. at 135.
112. Id. at 142.
113. Id. at 136-37.
114. Id. at 137-38.
115. Id. The court stated that "[a] public 'controversy' is any topic upon which sizeable
segments of society have different, strongly held views." Id. at 138. This definition appears
consistent with a footnote in Wolston, where the majority stated that no controversy existed
with regard to Soviet espionage because "all responsible United States citizens understandably were and are opposed to it." Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 166
n.8 (1979).
116. Lerman, 745 F.2d at 137.
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The court then analyzed the case to determine if Lerman had proven the
requisite standard of actual malice." 7 Since the publisher of the magazine
had settled the case with Lerman, the defendant in this case was the distributor.
The court stated that the distributor was not completely immune from liability
for defamation simply because it was not responsible for actually printing the
article." 8 However, in this case, the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that
the distributor acted with knowledge or reckless disregard for the falsity of the
magazine's statement that the subject of the nude photograph was the
plaintiff."9
3. Marcone v. Penthouse InternationalMagazinefor Men 20
Frank Marcone was a Philadelphia area attorney who received media
attention in the 1970s for representing two rival motorcycle gangs. Newspaper
articles had alleged that Marcone associated with motorcycle gang members
on a social basis. In 1976, Marcone along with 24 other persons, some of
whom were members of the motorcycle gangs, were charged with various
federal drug offenses. 12' The charges against Marcone were eventually
dismissed without prejudice. According to an assistant U.S. Attorney, the
reason for the dismissal was a legal technicality preventing the government
from tying Marcone to the conspiracy. 22 A 1978 article in Penthouse
asserted that Marcone had handled drug payments, but charges against him
were dismissed due to his cooperation with investigators. 23 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit proposed a two part test for determining
whether a defamation plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure, 24 and
applied the test to reverse a district court ruling that Marcone was not a public
figure."
The court interpreted the Gertz case as requiring consideration of whether
the subject of the defamatory statement is a public controversy, and if so, the

117. Id. at 139-41.
118. Id. at 139. The court was really saying that the distributor has some duty with
regard to the falsity of statements in the publications it distributes, but it is difficult to
imagine circumstances under which a distributor would know an item in the magazine it
distributes is false or be on notice of probable falsity.
119. Id. at 141.
120. 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
121. Id. at 1076.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1077.
124. Id. at 1082.
125. Id. at 1086-87.
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"nature and extent" of the plaintiffs involvement in the controversy. 126 The
court stated that a public controversy is an identifiable dispute that will impact
a segment of the public by its resolution, 27 and concluded that drug trafficking clearly fit this definition.2 8 The court then evaluated Marcone's
involvement to determine if he had voluntarily thrust himself to the forefront
of this controversy. Although neither criminal charges nor representation of
a notorious client are alone sufficient to render one a public figure, 29 the
court concluded that Marcone's voluntarily associations with reputed drug
dealers rendered him a public figure for the limited purpose of commentary on
the controversy surrounding drug trafficking.13° Accordingly, the court
concluded that Marcone had to establish that Penthouse acted with actual

malice in order to recover for the defamatory statement. Since the defendant

had investigated the accuracy of its statement and due to its reasonable reliance
on the author of the article, the court concluded that it had not acted with
3
actual malice.1 '
C. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC FIGURE TESTS BY LOWER COURTS

Although the lower courts have developed distinct tests to determine
whether a defamation plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure, these tests
can be characterized as different formulations of the same factors. Each of the
foregoing tests consider whether the plaintiff was involved in a public
controversy, whether the defamatory statement is related to the plaintiffs
126. Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1082.
127. Id. at 1083 (citing Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980)).
128. Id.
129. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979) (rejecting
notion that engaging in criminal conduct automatically renders the plaintiff a public figure);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974) (rejecting contention that representing
a famous client is alone sufficient to render plaintiff a public figure).
130. Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1084-87. Despite recognizing the Gertz requirement that the
plaintiffs conduct be calculated to influence the resolution of the controversy, the Marcone
court nevertheless held that activity which is likely to attract public attention is sufficient to
qualify the plaintiff as a limited purpose public figure. Under this standard, Hutchinson,
Wolston and even Gertz could be considered public figures.
131. Id. at 1089-90. The court noted that the magazine's failure to use the word
"alleged" when referring to the charges against the defendant did not establish actual malice.
Id. at 1090. Additionally, the statement that charges were dismissed due to the defendant's
cooperation was determined to be a justifiable mistake. A footnote in a government
document listed the disposition of drug charges against several defendants, and apparently
a phrase in the footnotes was misinterpreted as applying to all the defendants, including
Marcone. Id.
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involvement in that particular controversy, 132 and whether the plaintiff
voluntarily or intentionally thrust herself to the forefront of the controversy.
requires that the plaintiff maintain ongoing
The Lerman test additionally
1 33
access to the media.
Although the foregoing lower court tests appear to be similar to each
other, they have led to inconsistent results.)" The U.S. Supreme Court's
confusing use of "public controversy" in its limited purpose public figure
35
definition is one cause of these inconsistent lower court determinations.
132. The Waldbaum and Lerman tests require courts to evaluate whether the plaintiff
is involved in a public controversy and then, whether the defamatory statement is related to
that involvement, while the Marcone test combines these steps into a determination of
whether the subject matter of the defamatory statement is a public controversy. See supra
notes 94-95, 99, 113, 126 and accompanying text.
133. Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 123, 136-37 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985). The U.S. Supreme Court has always referred to media access
as a result of public figure status, rather than the other way around. The only case in which
the U.S. Supreme Court discussed media access as a factor in the public figure determination
was Hutchinson. However, the Hutchinson Court addressed this issue only because the lower
courts had relied on it in arriving at their determinations, and Proxmire contended that
Hutchinson was a public figure because of his media access. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111, 134, 136 (1979).
134. For the most part, whether a given subject was a public controversy and whether
the plaintiff voluntarily thrust herself to the forefront of the controversy have been the factors
that have led to inconsistent results. Where these two conditions are satisfied, courts have
uniformly found that the defamatory statement was related to the plaintiffs' involvement in
the particular public controversy. See Walker, supra note 72, at 974. The reason for this
is that many courts determine whether a controversy exists before analyzing the plaintiff's
role in the controversy. Instead of determining whether the plaintiff has thrust herself into
some controversy and then analyzing whether the statement in question is related to that
controversy, courts first look at the subject of the defamatory statement itself--if there is no
public controversy with regard to the subject, the plaintiff's conduct need not be analyzed.
135. The Gertz Court used the "public controversy" language as a descriptive term in
the analysis of a defamation plaintiff's activity, rather than as a separate element of the
limited purpose public figure determination. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
345 (1974). The Firestone Court's statement that divorce is not the type of public
controversy referred to in Gertz was perhaps prompted by the fact that participating in a court
proceeding to dissolve one's marriage is generally not the sort of activity that results in
access to the media, nor should its participants be deemed to have voluntarily exposed
themselves to increased public or media attention. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,
454 (1976). Clearly, however, the Firestone decision did not rest solely on the fact that the
Court did not consider divorce to be the sort of public controversy referred to in Gertz. The
Firestone Court noted that the plaintiff had not sought media attention in order to influence
the outcome or resolution of any issue. Id. at 453-54.
Despite the foregoing considerations, many lower courts, including the Waldbaum
court, have seized on the "public controversy" language and made this an entirely separate
element in the limited purpose public figure calculation. Additionally, many courts consider
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Many courts have chosen to follow the D.C. Circuit's formulation in Waldbaurn, requiring a determination of whether a public dispute exists, and if so,
whether the resolution of the dispute will impact the public.' 36 Other courts
eschew such determinations--concluding that public interest or newsworthiness alone indicates that the subject is a public controversy.' 37 One
example of the inconsistent lower court determinations of this issue is a
California appellate court holding that organized crime is not a public
controversy, a proposition which directly conflicts with a Fifth Circuit
holding. 3 s
Under Gertz, the plaintiff must voluntarily thrust herself to the forefront
of the public controversy for the purpose of influencing its resolution in order
to be considered a limited purpose public figure.' 39 This issue has also
caused inconsistent public figure determinations. In applying this factor, some
courts have held that the plaintiff must desire the public's attention,"a while
the public controversy issue first, making this finding a precondition to establishing the
plaintiff as a limited purpose public figure. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627
F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980). The definition of public
controversies is different from the definition of public concerns. See supra note 61. The
Gertz Court did not simply add a second step to the Rosenbloom test (requiring conduct
designed to influence the resolution of the controversy) and substitute the word "controversy"
in place of "concern." This is exactly the way Gertz must be read, however, in order to
formulate a limited purpose public figure test that denies constitutional protection for
statements that do not involve a public controversy.
136. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296. For those courts that follow the Waldbaum test, the
manner in which the subject being considered is defined is important to the determination
of whether the subject will be considered a public controversy. For example, the impact on
the public of issues regarding crime in general is different than the impact of the outcome
of a specific criminal trial.
137. Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 123, 138 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985) ("A public controversy is any topic upon which sizeable
segments of society have different, strongly held views."); Street v. National Broadcasting
Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981) (finding public
controversy based on public debate and news coverage of issue). This position appears to
be more in line with the Gertz Court's rejection of the Rosenbloom public interest test,
provided the court also analyzes the plaintiff's actions and the purpose for those actions.
However, some issues that are newsworthy cannot be labeled "public" controversies. See
Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454.
138. Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347, 354 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980); Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1978).
139. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
140. E.g., Lerman, 745 F.2d at 136-37. This factor appears to be an articulation of one
of the factors that prevented Elmer Gertz from being a limited purpose public figure. The
Gertz Court could have concluded that by agreeing to represent a party to a controversial
case, Elmer Gertz had voluntarily thrust himself to the forefront of a public controversy in
order to influence its outcome. However, the Court indicated that Gertz did not "engage the

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

other courts hold that the plaintiff who voluntarily participates in activity that
is likely to draw public attention has assumed the risk of public scrutiny. 4 '
Because many defamation plaintiffs do not desire the public attention they
receive, this distinction will be critical to the outcome of the public figure test
in many cases. For example, courts holding that it is irrelevant whether the
plaintiff desires public attention have held that professional athletes, 4 2 and
some criminals 43 were public figures, notwithstanding the fact that these
plaintiffs did not desire public attention or publicity.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE
An evaluation of the current public figure doctrine must begin with a
clear understanding of the competing policy interests that the doctrine seeks
to uphold. In New York Times, the Court defined the protection of the First
Amendment as extending to matters which are important to the democratic
When a defamatory statement is made
notion of self-government.'"
regarding a public official, the societal interest in commentary on issues
related to self-government necessitates casting a wide First Amendment net-placing the burden on the public official to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the publisher knew the defamatory statement was false or acted
with reckless disregard for the truth.' 45 The Gertz Court later extended the
protection of the First Amendment by holding that the New York Times actual
malice standard applied to public figures as well as public officials.
On the other side of the balancing equation lies the individual's interest
in redress for injury to her reputation caused by a defamatory statement. In
Gertz, the Court identified differences between public persons and private
public's attention." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. Similarly, the Hutchinson Court indicated that
Ronald Hutchinson had not "invited that degree of public attention and comment on his
receipt of federal grants essential to meet the public figure level." Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111, 135-36 (1979).
141. E.g., Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine For Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1083 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985). This position appears to be consistent with the
Gertz Court's statement that those who thrust themselves to the forefront of a public
controversy for the purpose of controlling its outcome "invite attention and comment." Gertz,
418 U.S. at 345. However, this language in Gertz does not eliminate the requirement that
the activity be engaged in by the plaintiff for the purpose of influencing the resolution of the
controversy. Accordingly, this position is contrary to Gertz and its progeny. See supra note
84 and accompanying text.
142. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
143. Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
144. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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individuals, and concluded that these differences justify applying the New York
Times constitutional privilege only to public officials and public figuies.'4
Accordingly, courts must determine the status of defamation plaintiffs, and
public figures are much more difficult to identify than public officials.
The goal of the New York Times decision was the prevention of the selfcensorship that results from the common law rule that a publisher must prove
the truth of her statements. 147 The underlying virtue of New York Times is
the clear standard that it provides for those who wish to comment on the
actions of public officials--any statement concerning a public official that the
publisher justifiably believes is true may be published without fear of liability
for defamation. Unfortunately, the Court's inability or unwillingness to
articulate clear guidelines for identifying public figures, particularly the
limited purpose public figure from Gertz, has led to unpredictable and inconsistent determinations of the status of defamation plaintiffs who are not public
officials. Those who wish to comment on the actions of such people are
frequently unable to determine in advance whether they will benefit from
constitutional protection. This uncertainty has resulted in the very selfcensorship that the New York Times Court sought to prevent. 148
Many lower courts and commentators favor the content-based approach
articulated by the Rosenbloom plurality 149 over the status-based approach of
Gertz. Commentators have criticized Gertz on many grounds, while lower
to
federal courts have established public figure tests designed to allow judges
50
"decide the plaintiff's status surreptitiously by looking first at content."1
One criticism advanced against the status-based approach is its lack of
clarity. Critics suggest that the difficulty in predicting how a court will rule
with regard to an individual's status leads to caution on the part of the media,
not only to avoid libel judgments,' 5 ' but also to avoid litigation costs.152

146. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974). See supra notes 52-55
and accompanying text.
147. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
148. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980). According to the Waldbaum Court, "members of the press
might choose to err on the side of suppression when trying to predict how a court would
analyze a news story's First Amendment status." Id.
149. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
150. Marc A. Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law: The Role of Content, 34 UCLA L.
REv. 1657, 1682 (1987).
151. See Franklin, supra note 150, at 1667. See also Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1293.
152. See Roselle L. Wissler et al., Why Current Libel Law Doesn't Work, 27 JUDGE'S
J., Spring, 1988, at 31 ("The chilling effect of libel suits is due more to litigation costs and
intrusion into the editorial process than to adverse judgments."). Determining whether a
particular statement involves a matter of public concern is by no means a simple determina-
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Another criticism is that the status-based approach provides inadequate
protection of the competing interests of free expression and freedom from
reputational harm. Those who advance this criticism assert that the Gertz
decision inadequately protects First Amendment interests by requiring courts
to extend greater First Amendment protection to statements regarding trivial
or private details about famous people than to statements regarding political53
activity of those who do not fit the Gertz public figure formulation
Additionally, critics contend that the Gertz status-based approach undervalues
the societal interest in redressing reputational injury by requiring those who
wish to participate in public controversies to substantially forfeit the protection
of their reputations."54
In addition to the ambiguity and anomalous results caused by the Gertz
public figure paradigm, the foundation of the Gertz decision has itself been the
subject of criticism.' 55 For example, public figures, it is argued, while
having much more to lose by reputational harm than private figures, are the
least likely to recover in an action for defamation.56

tion, but this concept does lend itself to a much more precise definition than the public figure
concept does. For this reason, a purely content based test would be more likely to result in
summary judgement being granted, and thus, would reduce the chilling effect of libel
litigation.
153. Franklin, supra note 150, at 1665, 1682. See also Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel
Tort Today, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 556 (1988).
While this criticism may have merit, very few cases will involve trivial statements
about all purpose public figures or public officials. See SMOLLA, supra note 61, at § 3.04.
154. James Chadwick, Comment, A Conflict in the Public Interest: Defamation and the
Role of Content in the Wake of Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 31 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 997, 1051, 1057 (1991). Advocating a content-based approach over the status-based
approach, one commentator stated:
The only sufficient justification for imposing on a plaintiff the nearly insurmountable burden of demonstrating "actual malice," then, is the need to
avoid placing on the public the truly impossible task of effectively guiding
the development of its own civic life without the ability to learn of and
comment on the people and events that shape that life.
Id. at 1057.
155. Prior to Gertz, the Rosenbloom Court had specifically rejected the assertion that
public figures should be treated differently than private figures because they had access to
the media and had invited media attention. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
156. Bezanson, supra note 153, at 542-43. According to Professor Bezanson:
[riecovery for injury to the reputation of public figures--a category that
includes, although is not limited to, the wealthy and powerful whose
protection was greatest at common law--is much more difficult than
recovery for injury to the reputation of a private individual. While the
common law . . . was imperfect and somewhat class-biased in its greater
protection of the wealthy and powerful, it is nonetheless likely that, as a

THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE

Many, if not all of the arguments levied against the Gertz public figure
formulation relate to the manner in which this formulation is applied by courts
rather than any inherent flaw in the status based approach itself. For example,
inconsistent and contradictory rulings on this issue have been achieved by
courts that were applying the same test.' 7 Additionally, the fact that many
lower federal courts are applying a public figure test that is more content-based
than the Gertz Court intended" 8 vitiates the argument that a content-based
test would result in more consistent and predictable results.
Regardless of the arguments against the status based approach, it can be
argued that the Gertz Court did not completely abandon content as a factor in
determining the appropriate balance between First Amendment interests and
the states' interest in compensating individuals for defamatory harm. In Dun
& Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 159 a plurality held that the
Gertz Court's prohibition of awards of presumed and punitive damages to a
private figure plaintiff absent a showing of actual malice did not apply when
6
the defamatory statement did not involve a matter of public concern.'
Justice Powell, the author of both the Greenmoss plurality and the Gertz
majority opinions, explained that the Gertz case involved speech on a matter
of public concern, and that the Gertz rules do not necessarily apply outside of
this context.' 6' Justice Powell explained that in Gertz the Court held that
"the fact that expression concerned a public issue did not by itself entitle the
62
libel defendant to the constitutional protection of New York Times."', The
New York Times protections, according to Justice Powell, "represented 'an
accommodation between [First Amendment] concern[s] and the limited state
1 63
interest present in the context of libel actions brought by public persons.,"
Because of the differences between public and private figure defamation
plaintiffs, 1'6 the state interest in compensating private plaintiffs was greater
than the state interest in compensating public figure plaintiffs. It was the

Id.

rule, the greatest reputational damages to a career or to an economic
livelihood will occur in such persons. If this proposition is accepted, the
conclusion seems inescapable that the constitutional privileges have limited
the instances of the tort's operation to the very cases in which the least
reputational harm has occurred.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
See supra note 150.
472 U.S. 749 (1985).
Id. at 761.
id. at 756-57.
Id. at 756 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974)).

164. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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states' interest in compensating these different defamation plaintiffs that was
the focus of the Gertz case. 65 Justice Powell stated, however, that "[n]othing in our [Gertz] opinion ... indicated that this same balance would be struck
regardless of the type of speech involved."'" The state's interest in compensating the plaintiff in Greenmoss was identical to the state interest involved in
Gertz because both plaintiffs were private figures, while the First Amendment
interest in the Greenmoss case was diminished because the defamatory
statement in question did not involve a matter of public concern.' 67 This
diminished First Amendment interest was outweighed by the state's interest
in awarding presumed and punitive damages to a private figure plaintiff.'6"
When Gertz and Greenmoss are read together, it is possible to conclude
that the issue of content (whether a statement is a matter of public concern)
applies to the First Amendment side of the Gertz balancing equation, while the
issue of the plaintiff's status applies to the states' interest in compensating
plaintiffs for defamatory harm. If this conclusion is proper, then the Gertz
Court did not completely abandon content as a factor in determining when
First Amendment protection should apply to a defamatory statement, but
simply overruled the Rosenbloom plurality's reliance on content as the sole
factor in this determination.' 69
Regardless of whether one favors a content- or status-based approach to
determining the appropriate First Amendment limitations on defamation cases,
courts are currently bound by the status-based approach chosen by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Gertz. Two decades have passed since the Gertz decision
was rendered and the Court has done nothing to indicate that this case will be
expanded or clarified in the near future. While the need for the Court to clear
up the confusion surrounding these issues seems obvious, it is equally obvious
that the Court is either unwilling or unable to do so.
CONCLUSION

In the years since New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court
has struggled to reconcile the First Amendment and the law of defamation. As
with attempts at legal categorization in other areas, the Court has been unable
to clearly draw the line that separates defamatory statements deserving of First

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
concern"

See supra note 55.
Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 756-57 (emphasis added).
Id. at 757-59.
Id. at 760.
See supra note 61 for a discussion of the differences between "matters of public
and "public controversies."
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Amendment protection from those that do not. While the failure to delineate
clear, rigid rules provides a needed degree of flexibility in many areas of the
law, the inability of the media to accurately predict whether a statement will
receive First Amendment protection prior to publication results in the
suppression of information, a result that the New York Times Court sought to
prevent. Unfortunately, this issue does not lend itself to the development of
a precise formula that will strike the appropriate balance in every case.

